The thesis of theory-ladenness of observations, in its various guises, is widely considered as either ill-conceived or harmless to the rationality of science. The latter view rests partly on the work of the proponents of New Experimentalism who have argued, among other things, that experimental practices are efficient in guarding against any epistemological threat posed by theory-ladenness. In this paper I show that one can generate a thesis of theoryladenness for experimental practices from an influential New Experimentalist account. The notion I introduce for this purpose is the concept of 'theory-driven data reliability judgments' (TDR), according to which theories which are sought to be tested with a particular set of data guide reliability judgments about those very same data. I provide various prominent historical examples (among others, the confirmation of Einstein's prediction of star light bending in 1919) to show that TDRs are used by scientists to resolve data conflicts. I argue that the rationality of the practices which employ TDRs can be saved if the independent support of the theories driving TDRs is construed in a particular way.
Introduction
The thesis of theory-ladenness of observations, roughly, is the idea that observations are affected by theoretical presuppositions. One can distinguish between at least three versions of theory-ladenness of observations (cf. Bogen 2010): (i) theories impact on perceptual processes so that 'what we see' is partially determined by our theoretical presuppositions;
(ii) observations cannot be described in a theory-neutral way and the meaning of observational terms is determined by theoretical presuppositions; (iii) theories make certain observations more salient than others because some observations are just more interesting from a certain theoretical perspective than others. An example for (i) is the anomalous playing card experiment, famously used by Kuhn (1996) , in which subjects "see" anomalous playing cards (such as the black four of hearts) as normal (namely, as the red four of hearts), because their conceptual categories are adjusted to the latter, but not the former. An example for (ii) is a different meaning of the term 'temperature' that the caloric theorist and the modern physicist assign to it, and an example for (iii) is the idea that different parts of a pendulum will be observationally salient for the Aristotelian and the Galilean, due to their respective concepts of motion.
The first version of the thesis of theory-ladenness of observations has been denied by various authors by appealing to the cognitive impenetrability of perceptions (Fodor 1984; Raftopoulos 2009 ). 1 The part of the second version that has it that there are hardly any pure observation reports is well accepted and is one of the reasons that led to the demise of logical positivism (Suppe 1977; van Fraassen 1980) . However the other part of the second version has also been denied. Most philosophers reject a holist conception of meaning as defended by Quine (1951) , and as implicitly held by Kuhn (1996) . The third version of the thesis of theory-ladenness has received considerably less attention than the former two versions, possibly because a theory rendering certain evidence more salient than other evidence is "neither inevitable nor irremediable" (Bogen 2010 ).
Not always is theory-ladenness (in whatever version) epistemologically problematic.
But in at least three scenarios it is. First, if observations are theory-laden with the assumptions that these observations are supposed to test, then the rationality of theorytesting is put in jeopardy on pain of circularity. Second, when observations are theory-laden by two logically incompatible theories, adherents of either theory may not reach agreement on which theory to adopt on the basis of these observations. Third, observations may be theory-laden in such a way that scientists perceive only confirming, but no disconfirming
evidence.
An important rebuttal of the epistemologically problematic forms of theoryladenness comes from so-called New Experimentalism. The New Experimentalism (a term coined by Ackermann 1989) promoted a turn away from the theory-observation dichotomy towards the experimental practices of science. It is often characterised in terms of Ian
Hacking's famous slogan of experiments having "a life of their own" independently of theory. Mayo (1994, 270-1) has given three readings of this slogan. In the first reading, "experimental inquiry may be quite independent of testing, confirming or filling out some theory". This reading, I take it, says that at least some parts of experimental practice are not directed by attempts to confirm or reject theories. Steinle (1997) aptly dubbed experiments that are not theory-driven and that are conducted in order to systematically explore new phenomenological realms "exploratory experiments". In the second reading, "experimental data may be justified [sic] independently of theory" 2 and "need not be theory-laden in any way that invalidates its role in grounding experimental arguments". In the third and last reading, "experimental knowledge may be retained despite theory change" (ibid., p. 270-1).
The most interesting thesis of New Experimentalism for present purposes clearly is Mayo's second reading of Hacking's slogan.
The New Experimentalists and their sympathizers have sought to rebuke the thesis of theory-ladenness in several ways. A strategy highlighted by Hacking (1983) and defended in detail by e.g. Culp (1995) is the so-called argument from coincidence or robustness: it would be a preposterous coincidence if the data produced by various experimental methods or instruments were to coincide and not be reliable. Even though the design and use of experimental methods or instruments presupposes the truth of certain theoretical assumptions, and even though some instruments may be laden with the same theoretical assumptions that are sought to be tested, the theory-ladenness of the individual measurement procedures is debilitated by the fact that a number of methods converge on the same results. Another way of rebuking the thesis of theory-ladenness is to deny its relevance. As Bogen and Woodward (1988) have claimed, theories are not tested on the basis of observations but rather on the basis of "typically unobservable" phenomena, which are inferred from the data through statistical and experimental methods. Since phenomena are normally not observable, they cannot possibly be theory-laden (cf. ibid., 342-7). Mayo (1996) has sought to erect a philosophy of experiment on the basis of her notion of severity of test and on the basis of error statistics. Experimental activities like ruling out artifacts, distinguishing signal from noise etc., according to Mayo, "receive structure from statistical methods and arguments" (1994, 272) . In Mayo's account there is usually no risk of theoryladenness since local experimental and statistical methods are distinct from the theory that is being tested.
Although the New Experimentalists, in order to escape the thesis of theoryladenness, have been keen to stress those procedures of experimental practice that are 2 Note that it is slightly awkward to speak of the justification of data rather than the justification of statements describing those data.
unaffected by the theories at stake, interestingly, the perhaps most extensive analysis of data reliability in science, i.e. Allan Franklin's account of 'epistemological strategies', does grant some role to those theories in data analysis. According to Franklin, such theories can guide judgments about data reliability if there is independent support for those theories (Section 2). Although prima facie epistemologically unproblematic, the problem of theoryladenness does crop up again if independent support is not construed in a particular wayor so I shall argue. Before presenting an argument to this effect, I shall first argue for the positive role of theories in guiding data reliability judgments. In particular I shall argue that guidance by theories is particularly valuable when it comes to data conflicts (Section 3). In
Section 4 I will then argue for a particular form of independent support in order to evade the threat of theory-ladenness. The more abstract discussion will be proffered by a number of examples from scientific practice in Section 5. Section 6 will draw attention to the diversity of attitudes when it comes to the use of theories as guides to making judgments about data reliability. Section 7 will conclude this paper.
Theory-driven data reliability judgments
In the parlance of scientists data can be 'good' or 'bad', reliable or unreliable 3 . What scientists mean by these predicates is that the data produced by an experiment either was or was not produced by the causal factors of interest. If an experiment produces data that result from some artifact or confounding factor that was not controlled for, then the data are 'spurious', not 'trustworthy', or simply unreliable. But data do not carry on their sleeves to what kind they belong. Scientists must therefore not only take various precautions when producing data, but they must also carry out sophisticated error estimates for which the raw data then have to be corrected. Only after these procedures have been carried out to a satisfactory degree we can speak of 'hard facts' against which we should want to test our theories.
In numerous publications, Allan Franklin has argued that scientists have a whole battery of 'epistemological strategies' at their disposal for ensuring data reliability (before, during, and after data production). These strategies, Franklin emphasizes, are not infallible rules but 3 Strictly speaking, it is not correct to speak of the reliability of data, since reliability is an attribute of a process. I nevertheless want to stick to scientists' jargon in this paper.
rather heuristic guides. As such they can steer researchers into the right direction, but they can also fail (e.g. Franklin 2002, 6) . Among those strategies, Franklin has listed the following:
1. Experimental checks and calibration, in which the experimental apparatus reproduces known phenomena; 2. Reproducing artifacts that are known in advance to be present; 3. Elimination of plausible sources of error and alternative explanations of the result (the Sherlock Holmes strategy); 4. Using the results themselves to argue for their validity; 5. Using an independently well-corroborated theory of the phenomena to explain the results; 6. Using an apparatus based on a well-corroborated theory; 7. Using statistical arguments.
As can easily be seen, most of Franklin's strategies are very much in the spirit of the second tenet of New Experimentalism. Interestingly, however, Franklin does indeed reserve a place for theories in efforts to establish data reliability (strategy 5). This strategy contains the seeds for what we are going to be concerned with in the remainder of this essay. Rather than further describing strategy 5, Franklin illustrates it with the example of the discovery of the W± bosons in 1983, as predicted by the Salam-Weinberg-Glashow model more than ten years earlier:
I believe that the agreement of the observations with the theoretical predictions of the particle properties helped to validate the experimental results. In this case the particle candidates were observed in events that contained an electron with high transverse momentum and in which there were no particle jets, just as predicted by the theory. In addition, the measured particle mass of 81 ± 5 GeV/c2 and 80+10-6, GeV/c2, found in the two experiments (note the independent confirmation also), was in good agreement with the theoretical prediction of 82 ± 2.4 GeV/c2. (Franklin 2002, 5, added emphasis) Let us first of all note that Franklin discusses only the positive uses of strategy 5 (and of the other strategies, for that matter). That is, although he claims that "the agreement of the observations with the theoretical predictions […] helped to validate the experimental results", he never mentions that theories could help to invalidate experimental results. But it is not clear on which grounds one would not want to allow for such a possibility. In fact, as we shall see later in Section 3, this possibility is not merely a logical possibility. Scientists actually do make use of it. It is also interesting to note that all the examples Franklin cites for strategy 5 concern cases in which the theories guiding data reliability judgments are the very same theories which the data in question are supposed to test. Of course this need not be so, but this class of data reliability judgments is certainly the most interesting class when it comes to concerns about theory-ladenness.
Allowing for both the positive and the negative guidance of theories in questions about data reliability, and assuming that the theory guiding judgments about data reliability is the very same theory the truth of which is at stake, I want to introduce the notion of theory-driven data reliability judgments (TDR):
TDR: An independently well supported theory T guides researchers in their assessment of the data by giving them good reasons for trusting that data implied by T are reliable and for doubting the reliability of those data that are not implied by T.
Theories that possess good inductive support induce the expectation that their predictions will be correct not only for the data at hand but also for other data. Barring the problem of induction, this expectation is reasonably rational. The inductive support of a theory may motivate the application of TDRs, i.e., it may guide scientists in their judgments about whether other data are reliable or not. Think of the recent report that neutrinos travel fast than the speed of light (Agafonova et al. 2010) . The immediate response of the physics community was disbelief and suspicion that some experimental error would account for the result. Given that Einstein's theory of relativity, which is built on the assumption that nothing travels faster than the speed of light, has had such tremendous empirical success in the past, it would have been everything but reasonable not to question the reliability of the reported results.
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TDR might raise concerns about theory-ladenness. If the theory guiding data reliability judgments about a set of data that is then used to test that very same theory, the concern is that the theory guides the judgments about data reliability in such a way that the question of whether or not the data are reliable will automatically be answered in the theory's favor. But such a concern would only be appropriate if the theory in question were to determine whether or not the data were reliable. Because then the reliability of the data would depend on the truth of the assumptions made by the theory in question, when it was 4 In a weak sense, the TDR thesis presupposes the truth of the Duhem-Quine thesis. According to that weak sense, a negative experimental result need not imply the falsity of the theory at stake; it may instead be due to a false auxiliary or background assumption. However the TDR thesis does not imply a stronger sense of the Duhem-Quine thesis, according to which we cannot know which part of the 'net' of our beliefs is mistaken. On the contrary, TDRs give the scientist clear directions of where to look for errors. See the next section for details. the truth of those assumptions that we wanted to find out about on the basis of the data in question. But of course TDR does not say that the reliability of the data is determined by the theory in question; all it says is that reliability judgments about a certain set of data can be guided by a theory whose truth is sought to be tested with those data. But how is the guidance of a theory in data reliability judgments to be understood?
Here is a way of thinking about it. TDRs guide the researcher in that they suggest to her an increase of efforts in her search for errors in those experiments which produced results that threatened the theory in question. In these efforts the researcher may then also perform new experiments in which she will attempt to tighten her control over those potential error sources. Conversely, if an experiment conforms to the predictions of a theory, the researcher will not be driven to perform error checks that go beyond the checks already carried out. In other words, TDRs may guide the researcher in her decision when to stop and when to continue in her error searches. Whether or not the researcher will find errors in the experiments is, at least in principle, an entirely contingent matter. Still, one may be worried about the following. Suppose an experiment E1 has been checked for errors. Because it agrees with T, error searches are not intensified. As a matter of fact, however, if there had been further error searches, scientists would have found further errors, shedding doubt on the trustworthiness of the original results. Since TDRs do not motivate scientists to probe E1 even harder than they already have, this error is never found. However, if this is a serious concern then it is not specific to TDRs. The risk of ending error searches prematurely is always a possibility, regardless of the application of TDRs.
Before turning our attention to epistemologically problematic forms of TDRs, let us ask why it might be attractive for scientists to apply TDRs in the first place.
TDRs and data conflicts
In his recent book Selectivity and Discord, Franklin (2002) highlights the problem of data conflicts as a significant problem for his account of epistemological strategies: […] it is a fact of life in empirical science that experiments often give discordant results. The occurrence of such discordant results [after the application of strategies] casts doubt on my epistemology of experiment and on the reasonable use of experimental results in science. If, as is the case, each of the experiments involved applied the epistemology of experiment, how can they produce discordant results? (Franklin 2002, p. 35; emphasis added) Franklin claims that " [t] he resolution [of data conflicts] must proceed by demonstrating that, at least in some experiments, the strategies have been applied incorrectly" (p. 162). "The perhaps most important method of invalidating a result", Franklin claims, "is to show that the Sherlock Holmes strategy has been incorrectly applied" (ibid.). More concretely, "one can argue … that a plausible source of error (e.g. a background that might either mask or mimic the correct result) has been overlooked" in one of the conflicting data sets (ibid.).
There are two ways of interpreting this sentence. Either scientists negligently overlooked an error source, or they were limited in their means in detecting an error at a particular point in time. Although the fact that Franklin speaks of an incorrect application of the Sherlock Holmes strategy (rather than of the correct but limited application of this strategy) seems to imply the former sense, it is plausible to assume that the failure to detect an error is more often due to the limited means of scientists at a particular point in time. Note that the latter type of error is just one form of the general fallibility of Franklin's strategies: Thus, data may conflict even after Franklin's strategies have successfully been applied simply because strategies may return a reliability verdict even though the data are not reliable. But note the following tension: if data conflicts occur frequently even after the strategies have been applied (see first quote), and if the fallibility of the strategy is to blame for these occurrences (rather than the scientists' negligence), then this would mean that the degree of fallibility of the strategies is high. But this is undesirable for Franklin for he regards the strategies as reliable guides for negotiating data reliability. There are two ways for Franklin to escape this dilemma. Either he retracts from his claim that data conflicts occur frequently even after the application of his strategies, or he does blame the scientist's negligence. The latter is certainly undesirable if one trusts the reliability and rationality of experimental practices, as Franklin does. However, with regard to the first horn of the dilemma, it would seem rather awkward for someone like Franklin, i.e., someone with knowledge about experimental practices as intricate as hardly any other philosopher, to have made such a terribly mistaken descriptive mistake. Whichever way we turn it, we seem to have reached a cul-de-sac in Franklin's account.
Franklin's account presents us with another puzzle. Franklin makes no distinctions between his strategies when it comes to the degree of fallibility; they all seem to be equally fallible. But if they are so, how do we figure out which strategies have let us down when data conflicts occur and when strategies have been applied to both data sets successfully?
Franklin suggests that data conflicts can be resolved when attempts to replicate either of the conflicting data sets fail (p. 162). That is, one may infer that, despite first appearances, the reliability verdict on a particular set of data given by particular strategies is false if the data are not replicable. And yet, data can be unreliable and indeed be replicable 5 . In the 1950s and 1960s so-called bacterial mesosomes (i.e. membranous invaginations) were considered to be real and biological parts of certain bacteria (Rasmussen 1993) . Over several years numerous replications were carried out in which mesosomes would show up. In other words, mesosomes were successfully replicated, even though they were not real. Yet in the mid-1970s biologists decided that mesosomes are indeed artifacts of the cytoprotection and fixation techniques. Consider another example. Before J.J. Thomson managed to deflect cathode rays with an electric field (in order to show that cathode rays consist of electrically charged particles, namely electrons) and 14 years after Heinrich Hertz's first attempts in 1883, it was not known that cathode rays would ionise the remaining gas in the cathode ray tubes (Hon 1987) . These ions would then neutralise the electric field and thereby prevent the deflection of cathode rays. Without any knowledge about this neutralising effect, about which Thomson had speculated (Falconer 1985) , this false null result could have been replicated ad nausea. Consider this last example. Over a period of over ten years now, stable data for and stable data against the hypothesis of antidepressants reducing the effectiveness of breast cancer drugs has been produced (Holzman 2009 ). Thus, unreliable experimental results not only can be replicable but they also can be stably replicable.
Although replicability undoubtedly is an important strategy for ensuring data reliability and for disambiguating data conflicts, scientists have a more principled means at their disposal, namely TDRs. Whereas it is possible for Franklin's other strategies and for replication to result in reliability verdicts about conflicting data sets, this cannot possibly happen when TDRs are applied. That is, if the theory driving TDRs is not inconsistent, TDRs must output that one data set is reliable and the other one isn't. Furthermore TDRs always indicate which data set might be reliable and which one might not. Of course, and this needs emphasizing, whether the data set singled out as unreliable actually is unreliable, is an entirely contingent matter. TDRs cannot determine the reliability of data. When applying TDRs the researcher only has inductive reasons for thinking that a particular data set is reliable or not. But the consequences entailed by the theory in question may of course be wrong (despite inductive support) and the relevant TDRs therefore false. Nevertheless, whether correct or not, a theory's consequences do give scientists a clear guidance as to where to increase error searches, indeed a much clearer guidance than the scientist can expect to receive from any of Franklin's other strategies.
One must guard against further misunderstandings. First, the TDR notion is no standalone notion. It needs to be filled with the life of experimental practices. That is, TDRs must be combined with any of Franklin's or with other experimental strategies in order to probe data reliability. TDRs are therefore perhaps best described as a sort of 'background constraint' on error searches and reliability judgments. Relatedly, the notion of TDR is indifferent about the type of error to which the error searches triggered by TDRs ultimately lead to.
6 Second, the TDR thesis is no universal thesis. That is, it may well be that TDRs are used only in some parts of scientific enquiry but not in others. Relatedly, it is no part of my thesis that TDRs are used by all researchers of a particular scientific community (in one particular corner of research). As we shall see in Section 3, however, there are historical examples of data reliability judgments which are best explained by the majority of the relevant scientific community applying TDRs. Third, scientists need not be aware of the fact that they do apply TDRs. That is, they may be aware only of the experimental strategies that are guided by TDRs without being aware of the fact that they are so guided.
TDRs, undetected error sources, and theory-ladenness
As we saw earlier, the TDR thesis per se is not epistemologically problematic. However, the situation is considerably complicated by the observation of scientists postulating undetected error sources. That is, when TDRs indicate the reliability of a certain experimental result (because the theory's predictions are inconsistent with it), and error searches are intensified as a result of that but turn out unsuccessful, it does happen that scientists, on the basis of . However what should be surprising is that scientists agree to deem experiments unreliable without being able to identify an error. This, I believe, is best explained by scientists applying TDRs.
The postulation of an undetected error source can be tentative or conclusive.
Whereas in the former case, the scientific community withholds judgment as to whether the theory in question is confirmed or not (e.g. by waiting for more unequivocal evidence), in the latter case, the scientific community makes a conclusive judgment about this question.
Certainly in the latter case, theory-ladenness must be a real concern. The theory driving data reliability judgments does seem to determine the reliability of the data relevant to its confirmation after all. But, as discussed above, for that to be the case the theory whose assumptions are to be tested would be presumed to be true, on pain of circularity. And yet, the theory does not determine the reliability of all relevant data but only those which are inconsistent with the theory's predictions. Does the theory receive support from those data that are predicted by the theory? The answer to this question seems to be strongly contextdependent. First consider the clear cases. In situations in which there is only positive evidence, the evidence does of course support the theory. In situations in which there is only negative evidence, it would be absurd for scientists to accept the theory as being confirmed by postulating undetected error sources for those. But consider situations in which there is positive and negative evidence. First assume that there are unequal amounts of positive and negative evidence. In contexts where the negative data constitute the vast majority of evidence, the theory should receive only little or no support at all from the positive evidence when the negative evidence is dismissed by the postulation of undetected error sources.
Conversely, in contexts in which it is the positive data that constitute the vast majority of evidence, it seems, the theory should indeed receive support from the positive evidence, even when the negative evidence were to be disqualified by postulating undetected error sources. Now consider the most interesting kinds of situations, namely situations in which there are roughly equal amounts of positive and negative evidence. In those situations the theory's being supported by the positive evidence would appear to be conditional on the negative evidence being unreliable. If in those situations the negative evidence were to be dismissed by the postulation of undetected error sources, not only the negative evidence being unreliable but also the positive evidence supporting the theory would seem to be conditional on the theory's being (approx.) true. In other words, the whole testing procedure would be circular. The negative and the positive evidence would be theory-laden in an epistemologically problematic way even though only the reliability of the negative evidence would be determined by the theory in question. But note that, contrary to first appearances, even in these situations it would not necessarily be irrational to adopt the theory in question. It would not be irrational in cases in which the theory in question had already garnered independent empirical support. The theory's independent support, in turn, would
give the scientists inductive reasons for questioning the reliability of the negative data and for treating the positive data as support for the theory in question. Of course, this independent support better be strong independent support for the inductive reasons to be good reasons.
Strong and weak independent support
What does it mean for a theory to be strongly supported? The right answer to this question may look trivial: the more evidence there is in a theory's favor, the stronger its support. But this is so only ceteris paribus. It is well-accepted that a theory that accommodates evidence in an ad hoc way should receive no support from that evidence. And it is accepted that this is so independently of the amount of evidence. Prima facie, a theory's best insurance against ad hoc accommodations is it to predict, rather than to accommodate, the facts. That is, a certain piece of evidence E can be accommodated by a theory T if E was known at the time T was proposed. But T could not have possibly accommodated E if E was not known at the time T was proposed. This gives us the following criteria for weak and strong empirical support.
Weak P-support: E is weak empirical support for T if E was not predicted but merely accommodated by T.
Strong P-support: E is strong empirical support for T if E was predicted by T.
In spite of the intuitive appeal of P-support, it has been pointed out that it is too strong a notion. John Worrall and others have shown in several important historical case studies that scientists do not appear to adopt it. Worrall (1989) for example showed that Fresnel's famous white spot prediction appears to have counted no more in the appraisal of Fresnel's theory than his accommodation of the already known straight edge diffraction phenomena (ibid.). In order to make sense of cases like these, Worrall has suggested that novel evidence instead be interpreted more broadly, namely as use-novel evidence: evidence E is use-novel with regard to a theory T that entails E, if E was not used in the construction of T. Usenovelty not only is in better accord with scientific practice but it also, Worrall claims, captures much better the intuition driving P-support: why should the bare time-order between T and E be of any significance for the confirmation of T by E? Worrall's account gives us the following support criteria:
Weak UN-support: E is weak (or no) empirical support for T if E was used in the construction of T.
Strong UN-support: E is strong empirical support for T if E was not used in the construction of T.
In the examples that I will consider in the next section, however, the independent support for the theories driving TDRs was only of the weak kind. By the lights of Weak UN-support, scientists applying TDRs in these cases had thus rather weak (if any) reasons to apply TDRs. It would then follow that in these cases scientists dismissed the data in question unjustifiably.
But given the prominence of these examples I think we should resist this implication. Rather I believe we need to question the plausibility of Weak and Strong UN-Support as methodological imperatives
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. In fact, there are well-rehearsed general criticisms of the plausibility of the UN criterion. The most damaging is perhaps this: why should it matter to the communal appraisal of a theory whether or not the individual constructing that theory 8 Worrall himself recognizes that the unqualified UN criterion is too strong. He therefore introduces the further constraint that UN violations must result in independent support for T (e.g. Worrall 2002) . Since independent support for T is what the Weak UN-support is supposed to establish in the context of the application of TDRs, appeal to independent support for T in order to establish independent support for T is circular.
sought to accommodate a particular fact or not. After all it seems overly optimistic to believe that this "biographical" information is always made transparent by those individuals and that it is always fully available to the community (cf. Gardner 1982) 9 . Hence, I want to suggest the following support criteria in the stead of UN-support:
Weak V-support: E is weak (or no) empirical support for T if E is explained or predicted by T and T is a non-virtuous (i.e. an inconsistent, piece-meal, convoluted, incoherent, 'infertile') theory.
Strong V-support: E is strong empirical support for T if E is explained or predicted by T and T is a virtuous (i.e. a consistent, unifying, simple, coherent, fertile) theory.
What are the motivations for this proposal? It is clear enough that a theory that is consistent should receive more support from a particular set of evidence than a theory that is inconsistent. It is also clear that a theory that unifies the phenomena in a simple and coherent way should receive more support from those phenomena than a theory that explains those phenomena by invoking conceptually distinct explanations that are only loosely related. A case in point is the competition between Lorentz's and Einstein's proposal for how to make sense of the Michelson-Morley ether drift null result. Lorentz's explanation was effectively the amendment of the then standard ether theory with the notorious Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction hypothesis. Whereas in the amended aether theory there remained "a strict separation of ether and matter", Einstein's theory of relativity provided a coherent theory, in which the laws governing matter and fields received a common justification in terms of Minkowski spacetime (Janssen 2002) .
How are the properties alluded to by V-support to be understood precisely? On some of them we appear to have a fairly good grasp. This is certainly so for the property of consistency and there have also been very influential accounts of unifying power (Kitcher 1981 ). Yet other theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and coherence, are notoriously hard to come by. Although there have been attempts to provide a rationale for the imperative of theories having to be simple (Forster and Sober 1994) , it is not clear that these discussions have implications beyond the limited domain in which they have been developed 10 . There 9 See (Schindler forthcoming) for more details. 10 Forster and Sober (1994) develop their account in the context of model selection. If a model is tied too closely to a particular "training set", then its capacity to accommodate new ('unexpected') data sets will be have been also attempts to spell out the property of coherence precisely (beyond the rough meaning of "things hanging well together") within the Bayesian framework (Bovens and Hartmann 2003) , but it is far from clear that these discussions have picked out the property that we mean when we attribute coherence to theories like Einstein's theory of relativity 11 .
The theoretical virtue of fertility was first described by Kuhn (1977) as the capacity to "disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among those already known" (p. 357). Kuhn was not more specific on this virtue than that, but, by others, fertility has been taken to imply more than the capacity to make novel predictions. McMullin (1976) for instance explains that a theory's fertility springs from its "imaginative resources" which "enable anomalies to be overcome and new and powerful extensions to be made" (p. 16).
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In whatever way the precise nature of these properties is going to be spelled out precisely in our final philosophy of science, one may, at the present point, more modestly, try to understand the role these properties should play in our philosophy of science 13 .
Indeed, a major aim of this essay may be understood as an attempt to direct attention to these properties when it comes to the confirmation of theories, attention that these properties have hitherto received only to a rather limited extend. This I want to do by posing the following (potential) dilemma with regard to the examples to be discussed in the next section: either we adopt the V-support criterion, and therefore regard the theories in question to be independently supported, or these cases must be deemed examples for irrational scientific practice due to the implied theory-ladenness. Since these cases are regularly considered to be examples for some of our most impressive scientific achievements, the second horn of the dilemma must be avoided at all costs. To many, the first horn of the dilemma, due to the difficulties associated with specifying the nature of diminished. It is important to note that a model's parameters that are fixed on the basis of a certain set of data are empirical parameters. It is not clear at all how their conclusion could be extrapolated to theories where simplicity does not refer to such empirical parameters but rather to much more abstract theoretical properties. 11 According to Bovens and Hartmann (2003), "[c] oherence is a property of an information set that boosts our confidence that its content is true ceteris paribus when we receive information from independent and partially reliable sources". However I believe this idea is much closer to the idea of robustness (see Introduction) than to the property of coherence. 12 More recently it has been denied that fertility is a virtue in its own right (Nolan 1999 ). This in turn has been criticized (Segall 2008) . 13 Note that this is also the strategy of one of the most recent writings on theoretical virtues. Okasha (2011) , for instance, applies Arrow's impossibility theorem-developed in the realm of social-choice theory-to the problem of theory-choice and draws a conclusion that is more pessimistic than the conclusions drawn by Kuhn (1977) in his classic piece on the topic: there are 'no algorithms' rather than 'too many algorithms' for theorychoice. Okasha simply adopts the five criteria of theory-choice identified by Kuhn without trying to further illuminate them.
theoretical virtues, will appear undesirable too (making the above a true dilemma). But the onus of making them a more integral part of our theories of confirmation, I believe, is certainly preferable to the other option.
General concerns
Before we can start to discuss examples for the application of TDRs and the postulation of undetected error sources in situations of data conflicts, we must briefly consider three general concerns.
First, if scientists hold different theories and disagree on which theory is better supported by the evidence, then they may be guided towards different reliability judgments.
In fact, such a scenario would be an instantiation of the second form of theory-ladenness introduced at the beginning of this essay. Second, one may be concerned that, if the postulation of undetected error sources were methodologically legitimate, theories could no longer be disconfirmed. After all, all counter-evidence might simply be disqualified as unreliable by postulating undetected error sources. As to the first concern, it seems reasonable to think that scientists, even if disagreeing on the degree of inductive support of theories, should mutatis mutandis prefer those theories that happen to postulate fewer undetected error sources in experiments than others. Similar remarks apply to the second concern. Also here, one would think, scientists should abandon theories that keep postulating undetected error sources with little confirmatory evidence to show for them in return.
The third concern is that TDRs, when combined with the postulation of undetected error sources smack very much of theoretical bias, which is generally regarded as detrimental to objective scientific work. However one must distinguish between two kinds of theoretical bias. There is one kind theoretical bias which one may refer to as theoretical bias of a psychological kind. A theoretical bias of a psychological kind means that data analysis is selective in such a way that it favors the theory that the scientist in question happens to hold. The causes for theoretical bias of this kind have to do with the scientist in question having put all her bets on the theory in question, having heavily invested work in this theory, having defended this theory publicly as being true, etc. The cause for her theoretical bias is therefore entirely psychological. Although understandable, this kind of theoretical bias is usually detrimental to scientific objectivity. Psychological concerns simply should not influence data analysis and theory confirmation. But the concept of TDR has got nothing to do with this kind of bias. Contrary to theoretical bias of the psychological kind, the 'bias' implied by TDRs is entirely epistemic. Whereas there are no good reasons for a bias of the psychological kind, as judged from an epistemological perspective, there are indeed good reasons for applying TDRs. These reasons, as pointed out above, are of an inductive kind.
When applying TDRs, one relies on the empirical support the theory has received from explaining another set of data. It is the independent support the theory driving TDRs has thus gained that gives one inductive reasons that the theory in question is correct also in the present case. Although these reasons are of course fallible, they are of an entirely different nature then the reasons one has when having a theoretical bias of the psychological kind.
Again, the former may legitimately figure in data assessments, whereas the latter shouldn't.
That the examples to be discussed in the next section are examples for TDRs and not for psychological bias is indicated by the fact that the majority of the scientific community appears to have followed the guidance of TDRs. Although it is not impossible that the majority of the scientific community developed a theoretical bias of a purely psychological kind, to the adherent of science being a rational enterprise, this must be an utterly unlikely possibility.
Resolving data conflict with TDRs: examples
The first example I want to discuss concerns electron-atom collision experiments conducted by J. Franck and G.L. Hertz in 1914 (Hon 1989) . In order to construct a "kinetic theory of electrons" and, in particular, in order to distinguish between elastic and inelastic collisions between electrons and atoms, Franck and Hertz tried to determine the kinetic energy of electrons transferred to atoms after their collisions with gas molecules. This they did "in an ingenious two-pronged attack" (Hon 2003) by measuring (i) the energy retained by the accelerated electrons after colliding with the gas molecules, and (ii) the frequency of light emitted by the molecules after bombardment. Frank and Hertz's results exhibited a regular rise and fall of the measured current caused by the electrons after colliding with the gas molecules as a function of the potential accelerating the electrons. The difference between the peaks of this plot gave the critical potential, which they measured at 4.9V and interpreted as ionization potential. On the basis of the quantum relation they related this critical potential to the emitted wave length of  = 2536.7 Å, which they measured when using an electron impact voltage of 4.9V. Their measurements were limited by their apparatus, which did not allow the determination of critical potentials much higher than 4.9V. The TDR that was thus applied ultimately led to the conclusion that Franck and Hertz and many others had committed an error of interpreting the critical potential as ionization potential rather than excitation potential (Hon 1989) . But in the present context, this is only of secondary interested. As mentioned above, the TDR thesis is indifferent about the kind of error that the error searches that are driven by the theories they seek to test ultimately lead to (cf. Section 2 and footnote 6).
absorption spectra of atoms, but it also did a good job at unifying all those data in a simple model. However even if there hadn't been any V-support, it seems, the use of TDRs would have been justified in this case. This is so, as far as I can see, since no undetected error sources were postulated in the judgment about Franck and Hertz's experiments being erroneous. But this was different in the next case we are going to consider: the discovery of the DNA structure in 1953.
In 1952 Rosalind Franklin had discovered that DNA could take two forms: a 'wet' and a 'dry' form (according to the amount of water molecules contained in it). It was pretty much uncontroversial that the x-ray crystallography evidence coming from the B form of DNA, i.e.
the 'wet' form, was straightforward evidence for a helical DNA structure. On the other hand, the x-ray crystallographic evidence for the A form wasn't so unequivocal. in the history of science. However, in a remarkable paper that re-analysed this episode, Earman and Glymour (1980) conclude:
The British results, taken at face value, were conflicting and could be held to confirm Einstein's [general] theory only if many of the measurements were ignored. (Earman and Glymour 1980, p. 51) Two expeditions (one to Sobral in Brazil, one to the island Principe off the West African coast) produced three data sets that can be categorized according to the sorts of telescopes that were used: (1) the Sobral 4 inch, (2) the Sobral astrographic and (3) the Principe astrographic. Whereas data set 1 (1.98''0.12'') and set 3 (1.61''0.30'') were roughly consistent with the prediction of Einstein's theory (1.75''), data set 2 (0.93'') was inconsistent with Einstein's theory but very much in agreement with the prediction of Newton's theory (0.87''). In the light bending measurements, as in so many experiments in physics, the physical "signal" of interest had to be discerned from a background effect. In the present case this background effect was a "change of scale" in the recorded pictures of the starfields due to an instrumental artifact (in particular: an accidental change of focus) that could be caused by temperature differences. Glymour point out, data set 1 was no better evidence for Einstein's theory than data set 3 was for Newton's theory. In other words, interpreting data 3 in favour of Einstein's theory (rather than Newton's theory) was to some extent arbitrary. Furthermore, even though the 18 Cf. Thomson (1919) .
value for star light deflection determined from data set 1 was significantly higher than the one predicted by Einstein, it was interpreted as confirming Einstein's theory. Earman and Glymour infer that physicists presupposed a "trichotomy of possible results" that they never argued for: the results would either indicate no starlight deflection, a deflection consistent with Newton's theory, or a deflection with Einstein's theory. Only then, and under the supposition of data set 2 being somehow erroneous, "the results had to be viewed as confirmation of Einstein's prediction" (pp. 79-80). Earman and Glymour reach a similarly gloomy verdict on Einstein's redshift prediction. They conclude: "If one were willing to throw out most of the data, one could argue that Einstein's prediction was confirmed" (p. 51).
Recently, Earman and Glymour's conclusions have been challenged by Kennefick (2009). Kennefick is concerned in particular with the idea that data set 2 was thrown out because the physicists analysing the data were biased toward Einstein's theory of relativity.
Kennefick defends the British physicists with three arguments. First, Kennefick acknowledges that Eddington took a "theory-centric approach to data analysis", but he deems this irrelevant to the question of whether or not the analysis of data set 2 was biased, since he contends that it was Dyson, not Eddington, who analyzed data set 2. 19 But Dyson, Kennefick argues, was "moderately skeptical" about Einstein's theory (2009, p. 40) . The fact that Dyson was not positively inclined towards Einstein's theory, Kennefick takes to be at least prima facie evidence against the idea that the data analysis was carried out in such a way that it was unduly favorable to Einstein's theory. Kennefick's second argument is his most sophisticated. It runs as follows. Kennefick stresses that the British physicists were hesitant as to whether the "effects of the sun's heat on the mirror" caused a "real change of scale or merely blurred the images" (Dyson et al. 1919, p. 309 ). As mentioned above, a change of scale would have implied a significant experimental error, which then would have to be corrected for. The British physicists in fact considered both possibilities in their paper.
Whereas they obtained the aforementioned low value when assuming a change of scale, they calculated a value of 1.56'' when assuming that the instruments were working fine. The latter value, Kennefick claims, would have been "not far off Eddington's Principe result" (Kennefick 2009, p. 42 ). Kennefick concludes that Support for the Newtonian theory was thus, in some sense, logically incompatible with the instruments having behaved in the intended manner. I suspect that line of argument strongly influenced the Greenwich team's decision to exclude the astrographic data from their final report (ibid.).
And because Eddington, too, had come to the conclusion that no real change of scale occurred in his eclipse recordings at Principe under very similar climatic conditions, the assumption of "no significant change of scale" at Sobral was a plausible assumption.
Nevertheless, Dyson et al. dismissed data set 2 because they were not able to determine beyond doubt whether the plausible assumption of "no change of scale" was actually correct. Third, Kennefick seeks to rehabilitate the British physicists for their "throwing out" of data set 2 by citing a re-analysis of the eclipse experiments in 1979, which seems to retrospectively vindicate the assumption that the loss of focus in the images of data set 2 did not cause a change of scale but mere blurring, for the re-analysis reproduced a value of 1.55''±0.34'', very close to the value estimated by Dyson et al. Hence Dyson et al. were correct to suspect that a change of scale had not occurred; their decision to exclude data set 2 on the suspicion that it might support Einstein's theory was therefore reasonable.
I find Kennefick's arguments unconvincing. With regard to Kennefick's first argument, it must again be emphasized that neither Eddington, nor Dyson mentioned data set 2 when presenting the results of their expeditions to the physics community (cf. Earman and Glymour 1980, p. 77 ). And they both mentioned but dismissed data set 2 in their detailed published report (Dyson et al. 1920) . First note that it is not unproblematic to cite a data re-analysis as justification for the neutrality of an original data analysis with respect to a theory that had been just proposed, when the re-analysis was carried out at a time when the theory potentially causing bias has been accepted for decades and when the people carrying out the original analysis have become celebrated heroes. If anything, the bias towards a result compatible with the theory must be exceedingly more likely for the re-analysis than for the original analysis. This is no mere logical possibility. In fact there is a clear indication that the re-analysis was indeed biased towards Einstein's theory. A re-analysis has got to make a decision about whether an actual change of scale had occurred or not. The re-analysis Kennefick is citing, it appears, simply assumes (without argument) that a change of scale did not occur. It is therefore not particularly surprising that they produced a result that coincides with Dyson at al.'s "no change of scale"-estimation. But such a re-analysis does nothing to justify precisely what is at stake, namely the assumption that no change of scale had occurred.
Let us now consider Kennefick's second point. For the sake of the argument let us assume that the reasoning Kennefick attributes to Dyson et al. is accurate and Dyson et al.
felt licensed to exclude data set 2 from their considerations because (i) if the instruments had worked in the intended manner, the data would have supported Einstein's theory, (ii) the instruments at Principe (producing data set 3) in fact worked in the intended manner, and (iii) it was plausible to assume that the instruments producing data set 2 should behave just as the instruments at Principe. But all of these premises are problematic. First, it is at least questionable whether a deflection of 1.52'' would have been real evidence for
Einstein's theory. 20 Second, with regard to premise (ii) and (iii), one must refer to Earman and Glymour's (1980, p. 79) observation that the images of data set 3 were in fact more blurred than the images of data set 2! Given that a blurring of the images was likely to be caused by a change of focus, which in turn would imply a change of scale rather than star light bending, Kennefick's chain of reasoning can be turned around. Rather than inferring the truth of the "no scale assumption" for data set 2 from data set 3, one might question the accuracy of the "no scale assumption" for data set 3 on the basis of the doubtfulness of this assumption in the analysis of data set 2. And then, one might want to ask whether it is legitimate at all to draw any inferences between the two data sets, as Kennefick supposes.
At the very least, it's not clear that one can. In any case, nothing in the original publications suggests that Dyson et al. drew any such inference. On the contrary, they treated data set 2 20 Recall that Earman and Glymour point out that the value inferred from data set 3 was not in much better agreement with Einstein's theory than with Newton's, and that the value for data set 2 is even lower than the one of data set 3. and 3 as being of different quality. Whereas data set 3 was argued to be reliable, data set 2 received a detrimental assessment:
The results obtained with a similar instrument at Sobral are considered to be largely vitiated by systematic errors. (Dyson et al. 1920, p. 330) Kennefick (2007) himself, in a more extensive discussion of the case, concedes that data set 3 was so "meager" that "another experimenter [than Eddington, who gathered and analyzed the results] would have been tempted to discard [it] altogether". So the real question then must be: why did the British physicists discard data set 2 rather than data set 3, even though data set 3 was no better (perhaps worse) than data set 2? This is the question that Earman and Glymour really posed. Kennefick provides no answer to this question. Perhaps even more interesting is the question why the physics community took Einstein's theory to be confirmed by the positive light bending evidence and why they accepted that data set 2 was to be ignored.
So here now finally is how the concept of TDR makes sense of this historical episode.
The TDR thesis, recall, says that independently well supported theories may drive scientists to treat as reliable those results that are consistent with the theory and as unreliable those results which are not. And indeed, what the above discussion shows is that the data consistent with Einstein's theory (data set 1 and 3) were regarded as reliable and the data inconsistent with it (data set 2) were not. In agreement with the TDR thesis, Dyson et al. sought to bring in agreement with the theory those data that contradicted it (data set 2).
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This they did by questioning the most natural assumption of a change of scale being the cause for the change in focus. Although this would indeed have brought the result closer to
Einstein's prediction of 1.75'', 1.52'' was still considerably below it. Faced with a choice of interpreting data set 2 as a result against Einstein's theory or as a result at most loosely compatible with it, they chose to entirely dismiss the sample as unreliable. In contrast, there were apparently no efforts to undermine data set 3, even though it was qualitatively no better (or even worse) than data set 2. Both of these observations are thus explained by the TDR thesis. Another observation by Glymour and Earman can be explained. As they point out, the British physicists presupposed a trichotomy of possible results: results consistent with Einstein's theory, results consistent with Newton's theory, or no star light deflection.
Crucially, the star light deflection inferred from data set 1, Earman and Glymour explain, was interpreted as falling into the first category even though the measured value was significantly higher than the prediction by Einstein. Indeed this continued to be so for decades of light bending measurements (von Kluber 1960 Dyson et al. (1919 Dyson et al. ( , 1920 explicitly mentioned this in the presentation of their results. Again, the advance of Mercury's perihelion lends support to Einstein's theory only under V-support: it clearly was no temporally novel prediction (thus violating P-support), and it is now known that Einstein did indeed try to accommodate it when constructing his theory (Earman and Glymour 1978) , thus violating UN-support.
Another example that can be cited in illustration of the disambiguation of data conflicts through TDRs is the notorious Millikan-Ehrenhaft dispute about the measurement of charge of electrons in the 1910s (Holton 1978 Franklin (1990b Franklin ( , 1990a , that the WashingtonOxford experiments and the results from Novosibirsk and Berkeley "neutralized" each other, with a suspension of judgment about atomic parity violation being correct or not, this is not what happened. As Pickering (1990) points out, rather awkwardly, several research reviews favored those results that confirmed the GWS theory, without there being clear experimental grounds on which those results could have been preferred. On this rather shaky basis, Dydak (1979) , for instance, concluded that the results from Novosibirsk and
Berkeley are "in good agreement with the standard model" (13).
In an attempt to explain the dismissal of the Washington-Oxford experiments, despite the failure to detect any errors in them, Franklin (1990b Franklin ( , 1990a provides the following arguments. First, Franklin stresses the presence of systematic uncertainties in the Washington-Oxford experiments. Second, although conceding that it was never established why the Washington-Oxford experiments gave negative results, Franklin speculates that the early atomic parity violation experiments contained unknown systematic uncertainties and claims that the later atomic physics parity violation experiments that were carried out in the early 1980s (including re-runs by the Washington-Oxford groups with a different experimental apparatus) which did indeed confirm the GWS's prediction, were "more accurate" than the early ones. Third, Franklin notes that the results published by the Washington and Oxford groups in a joint preliminary report and in more detailed separate 24 Pickering furthermore points out that E122 was a rather peculiar experiment (at least at the time) in that it was performed once and was never replicated. If replicability is a good guide to the reliability of experimental results (as Franklin stresses himself in other contexts), then the results of E122 were not immune to being subject to doubt.
publications were "mutually inconsistent" and were therefore looked upon with suspicion.
None of these arguments, however, is convincing.
First, systematic uncertainties are nothing special. E122 had to deal with them too.
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And, rather curiously, Franklin discusses the ways in which systematic uncertainties were controlled in the latter, but not in the former experiments (Pickering 1990) . Second, Franklin's speculation that the early Washington-Oxford experiments contained unknown systematic uncertainties is really not more than that: a speculation. For the claim that the latter atomic parity experiments were more accurate than the early Washington-Oxford experiments, Franklin cites merely their alleged inconsistency. This brings us to Franklin's third argument. Here two points can be made. First, the fact that the preliminary report by the Washington-Oxford group was significantly different from their later more detailed reported experiments ought not to give one too much of a headache. After all, their first report was preliminary. It always takes time to fine-tune an experimental apparatus. Franklin claims that the physics community was troubled by this, but he provides no evidence for this claim apart from a private conversation with a single physicist who "recalls such discussion" (Franklin 1990b, 168) . Second, if the consistency of results was really as epistemically meaningful as Franklin has it, physicists should have dismissed the positive results from Novosibirsk (1.070.14) and Berkeley (2.3 . . ) rather than the results from Washington (0.0-0.2) and Oxford (0.0-0.1). Indeed one must be doubtful about the reliability of the results from Novosibirsk and Berkeley: the latter was only two standard deviations from zero, and the Novosibirsk group not only had a dubious track record (Pickering 1990, 462) , but would ultimately report a result of about twice the value (-20.22.7) obtained by the later experiments by Oxford and Washington (9.31.5 and 10.41.7, respectively). Incidentally, these final results on atomic parity violation were, contrary to Franklin's assertion, everything but mutually consistent.
The TDR thesis, contrary to Franklin's and Pickering's accounts, 26 provides a plausible explanation for the history of experiments on parity violation. First, the TDR thesis explains why physicists performed further experiments that would confirm the GWS atomic parity 25 One way of dealing with uncertainties is the replication of the results with slightly different experiments. But as mentioned in the previous footnote, the results from E122 were never replicated. 26 Pickering (1984, 301-2) tries to explain this episode in terms of his concept of 'social symbiosis', according to which theorists and experimentalists drew on each other's work in order to justify their respective practices. This concept, however, does not explain why the physics community went along with the GWS model rather than with its possible alternatives. See also (Schindler under review) forthcoming.
prediction, despite their initial negative results. Second, the TDR thesis explains why, although E122 had no direct bearing on the atomic parity violation data, it fuelled the TDRs derived from the GWS model that demanded parity violation also in the atomic realm. This explains why the physics community took a skeptical attitude towards the WashingtonOxford experiments particularly after E122. Lastly, the TDR thesis explains why WashingtonOxford experiments were deemed unreliable despite no errors being found. That is, they were deemed unreliable because the inductive support (indeed P-support, in this case) of the GWS model gave physicists good reasons for such doubts. Fittingly, Steven Weinberg has commented on this episode that [the GWS model's] naturalness was being used to help physicists weigh conflicting experimental data. (Weinberg 1994, 100) 27
Remarks like Weinberg's, which very much suggest at least some awareness of TDRs in the scientific community, can even be found in the original publications. When Sudarshan and Marshak (1957) and Feynman and Gell-Mann (1958) long before the GWS model simultaneously proposed their V-A theory of weak interactions, not less than four experiments contradicted it. Sudarshan and Marshak (1957) demanded that "all of these experiments should be redone" and Feynman and Gell-Mann (1958) , after emphasizing the theoretical elegance of their model
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, stated that These theoretical arguments seem to the authors to be strong enough to suggest that the disagreement with the Helium 6 recoil experiment and with some other less accurate experiments indicates that these experiments are wrong. (ibid. p. 198) And indeed, driven by the virtuous properties of the V-A theory of weak interactions, physicists re-did the relevant experiments, re-checked various potential confounding sources, and eventually produced the desired results (Franklin 1990b ).
Conclusion
In this paper I invigorated the time-honoured concept of theory-ladenness with the introduction of the notion of theory-driven-data reliability judgments (TDR). According to 27 In the context of theory-choice and the Copernican system McMullin (1993) has argued against T. S. Kuhn that the "naturalness" of a theory is to be equated with the theory's coherence. I believe that is what Weinberg too has in mind here. 28 Feynman and Gell-Mann name the following internal properties: universality, symmetry, parity violation, conservation of leptons, preservation of invariance under CP and T, and the simplicity of the model. This case was brought to my attention by Allan Franklin. He discusses the case in detail in Franklin (1990) .
the TDR thesis the assessment of data is guided by the very same theories these data are supposed to test. Although not epistemologically problematic per se, TDRs do imply theoryladenness of the problematic kind when their application leads to the postulation of undetected error sources in those experiments which the theory driving TDRs is inconsistent with. I argued that the threat of theory-ladenness can be averted if our notion of independent support allows for a theory to be supported by evidence that it neither anticipated nor explained in a use-novel way. According to the notion of independent support proposed here, a theory may receive strong independent support from evidence that it explains in a virtuous way.
